World has little option but to settle in for the long haul in wait for democratic change.

BY CHRISTOPHER SABATINI

Washington’s sanctions relief helped encourage Maduro to hold elections; but the US could not make them free and fair. Now what?

Venezuela’s July 28 elections were always about more than the future of democracy in South America. The lives and hopes of the 29 million Venezuelans still living through a humanitarian and political crisis in the country represent a global and moral concern.

Beyond the country’s borders, the international reaction to President Nicolas Maduro’s questionable re-election has serious implications for regional and international norms and institutions. Venezuela’s stolen elections could affect the domestic politics of Brazil, Colombia and the United States, in ways that favor the interests and ambitions of Russia and China.

Violation of international commitments

Venezuela’s presidential election of July 28 was the result of an international agreement announced on October 17, 2023 that saw Maduro’s government commit to holding a free and fair contest in 2024. In response, the next day the US loosened economic sanctions.

In the 10 months that followed, the conditions for a free and fair election quickly went off the rails. Venezuela’s pro-government Supreme Court disqualified the leading opposition candidate, Maria Corina Machado, and the government arrested more than 70 members of her team, detaining over 100 more. In addition, the government and its security forces – including pro-government militia – harassed opposition rallies and the opposition’s access to national media was blocked.

Machado responded by throwing her considerable popular momentum – rock star status even – behind a mild-mannered 74-year-old retired diplomat, Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia. Gonzalez led Maduro in the polls by between 25 to 30 percentage points in the weeks leading up to the election.

But on election day, six hours after voting centers were supposed to close, the pro-Maduro electoral commission announced that the president had been re-elected to a third term, winning 51 per cent of the vote to 44 for Gonzalez.

The commission, however, never provided the actual tallies. Governments including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, the UK, US and the EU refused to recognize the results without evidence.

Notably, others rushed to congratulate Maduro, issuing lofty statements of solidarity. That rogues’ gallery included China, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia and Syria – representing a coalition of global states that are actively seeking to weaken international commitments to human rights and popular sovereignty.

Russian and Chinese interests

In private, Chinese officials have expressed frustration over Maduro’s economic mismanagement.

But Venezuela makes a convenient ally in Beijing’s competition with Washington. The country is strategically located in a region typically defined as the US’s sphere of influence, sits on the world’s largest proven reserves of oil, and is governed by a president who repeatedly defies US power, sticking a thumb in the eye of international standards on free and fair elections and international scrutiny of human rights.

For Russia too Venezuela provides a symbolic ally. A month before the election, Russian warships docked in a Venezuelan port – an in-your-face (if only symbolic) show of force in the US’s backyard, and a sign of support for Maduro against his own people. What Russia can offer materially to relieve the humanitarian crisis the beleaguered government presides over is unclear – beyond channels to avoid US economic sanctions which are sure to be tightened after Sunday’s election fiasco.

The same is true for Iran, which since 2019 has helped process and launder Venezuela’s oil exports in violation of US sanctions.

The ineffable but real threat to international norms

There was a time in the 1990s and early 2000s when international election monitors’ assessment of elections mattered for global estimation of the moral authority and legitimacy of governments.

Venezuela’s sham contest proves those days are long gone. In late May, Venezuela’s electoral commission revoked an invitation to the EU to send an election observation mission.

Instead, observers from China and Russia were invited – hardly credible monitors of a democratic exercise.

The only reliable observers remaining were a four-person UN expert panel and a Carter Center team of less than 20 – hardly enough, by their own admission, to cover the 14,000 plus voting centers and mount a comprehensive effort.

Nevertheless, the Carter Center’s recent report is scathing. Its opening statement says it all: ‘Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic’.

The question is how can a fractured international community respond, as China, Iran and Russia rush to embrace the fraudulent result? Multilateral responses through the UN are impossible given Russia and China’s complicity. And economic and individual sanctions imposed by the US, UK and EU have failed to provoke the desired response.

The inhumane weapon of refugees post elections

There is another element to the cruel calculation at work in China and Russia’s backing of the Maduro government.

In the past decade more than 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled the country’s humanitarian disaster. In pre-election surveys up to 30 per cent of Venezuelans claimed they planned to leave the country if Maduro was re-elected. Even a fraction of that outflow would create significant friction in neighboring countries and the US.

Countries like Colombia, Brazil, Argentina and Peru have welcomed many of Maduro’s refugees. But the influx has started to create strains on public services and labor markets. There are approximately 3 million Venezuelan immigrants in Colombia, and close to a million in Brazil.

Social and political backlash against Venezuelan refugees is growing in Colombia and Chile, partly stoked – in some cases unfairly – over fears of rising crime linked to Venezuelan transnational criminal groups, such as Tren de Agua.

In the US, immigration has become a hot-button issue in the lead up to the November presidential elections. An estimated 800,000 Venezuelan refugees are in the country, many of them having crossed the border illegally.

It is not a stretch to believe that China and Russia would welcome the discord and social upheaval a renewed migration crisis would bring in democratic countries like Brazil, Chile, Colombia and the US.

To prevent this, there are only bad options. Washington must now pick from them. Some return of sanctions will be necessary. The first step should be targeted personal sanctions on individuals in the electoral authority and security forces. These should be coordinated with partners in Europe and Latin America.

Those governments should also collaborate with companies invested in Venezuela. Oil and gas firms from the US, Spain, UK, and France benefitted from the sanctions liberalization; they should now be prepared to shut down operations to help pressure the Maduro government to negotiate.

Across Latin America, countries that have constructively engaged in the electoral process, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay should coordinate a regional response.

Maduro is clearly attempting to stay in power at all costs. The international community needs to make it clear that it will seek to protect Venezuelan citizens from sanctions, but elements associated with the regime will suffer.

Maduro has resisted such efforts before; unfortunately the world has little option but to settle in for the long haul in its wait for democratic change in Venezuela.

Dr Christopher Sabatini is Senior Research Fellow for Latin America, US and the Americas Program at Chatham House.

This article was originally published by Chatham House. Republished with permission.

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