As trust in the United States erodes, China becomes familiar—and hard to ignore.

BY BRUNA SANTOS

China is now viewed more favorably than the United States in 25 of the 36 countries included in a new Pew Research Center survey. That does not mean the world has embraced China’s political system or suddenly come to trust Beijing. Confidence in Xi Jinping remains low in most countries.

China’s gains owe less to growing admiration for Beijing than to declining confidence in Washington. It can expand its influence without first becoming widely trusted.

The decline now reaches well beyond countries that have long been critical of American foreign policy. It includes close allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, along with Canada. Between 2023 and 2026, the share of Canadians with a favorable view of the United States fell from 57 % to 33%. Favorable views of China rose from 14% to 44%.

Richard Wike, who leads Pew’s global attitudes research, argues that the current decline differs from earlier waves of anti-American sentiment. Opposition to the Iraq War or to Donald Trump’s first administration could be fierce, but it was often tied to a particular conflict, president, or policy.

Today, the doubts run deeper. They concern the country’s reliability and its role in the world. Across the 36 countries surveyed, a median of 37% held a favorable opinion of the United States. Only 35% said it contributes significantly to global peace and stability. Just 32% believed Washington considers the interests of countries like theirs when making foreign policy.

Influence is relative. Beijing does not have to persuade foreign publics that China offers a better political model. It benefits when it appears more consistent, more useful, or less disruptive than Washington.

China is now viewed more favorably than the United States in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, four of the six Latin American countries included in the Pew survey. In Brazil and Colombia, the ratings are roughly even. A decade ago, the picture looked very different. In 2014, the United States had a more favorable image in nearly every Latin American country surveyed.

Yet Latin Americans generally express limited confidence in both Trump and Xi. Their views of China are often pragmatic rather than ideological. What is changing is how they judge the behavior of the two powers and what each one brings to the relationship.

The belief that the United States interferes in other countries’ affairs is widespread across the region. Far fewer people say the same about China. The Pew survey showed that 76% of Brazilians believe the United States interferes in the affairs of other countries, whereas 50% believe this about China.

On reliability, Brazil is almost evenly divided: 40% see China as a reliable partner, while 36% say that about the United States. The difference is not statistically significant. China’s advantage is larger elsewhere, reaching 58% to 34% in Mexico and 55% to 47% in Chile.

These figures reflect Latin America’s longstanding preference for autonomy, now playing out under different conditions. Countries across the region want ties with both powers and remain wary of depending too heavily on either.

China becomes part of everyday life

Having followed Brazil’s relationship with China since 2010, I have watched that presence move steadily closer to the daily lives of Brazilians.

For many years, the relationship was mostly discussed in terms of commodities and presidential diplomacy: China bought Brazilian soybeans and iron ore, and Brazilian presidents visited Beijing, while Chinese companies invested in transmission lines, oil projects, and infrastructure that few people associated directly with China.

Today, Chinese brands are in the phones Brazilians use, the cars they drive, the platforms where they shop, and the equipment behind parts of the country’s energy transition.

Xiaomi, BYD, and GWM have given the relationship a consumer face. The shift is partly generational. Many older Brazilians still associate Chinese products with cheap imports of dubious quality. Younger consumers are more likely to encounter China through an affordable smartphone or an electric vehicle that combines new technology with a competitive price.

China is no longer confined to presidential summits and commodity terminals. It is present in Brazilian homes and on Brazilian streets.

Trade figures show the scale of the relationship. According to the Brazil-China Business Council, Brazilian exports to China reached a record $58.3 billion in the first six months of 2026. Imports also reached a record, at $38.5 billion.

The composition of that trade remains troubling for Brazil. Soybeans, oil, and iron ore accounted for 76.5% of Brazilian exports to China during the period. Manufactured products made up 99.8% of imports.  Brazil continues to sell raw materials and buy increasingly sophisticated goods. Unless the country strengthens its industrial, technological, and investment policies, that pattern could constrain its development.

But the composition of imports also helps explain the change in public attitudes.

In the first half of 2026, Brazil imported $5.35 billion in electric, hybrid, and plug-in hybrid vehicles. China supplied 88% of all electrified vehicles imported into the country. Imports of Chinese electric vehicles were almost four times higher than during the same period in 2025, while purchases of plug-in hybrids doubled.

For many consumers, “made in China” now evokes mobility and technology rather than disposable, low-quality goods.

Investment is making China more visible at the local level as well. A project-level survey by the Brazil-China Business Council found that Brazil was the leading destination for Chinese investment in 2025. Chinese companies invested $6.1 billion through projects in 20 states, with activity in electricity, mining, and the automotive industry. A factory, power project, or mining operation changes how a foreign country is perceived. China becomes an employer, a supplier, a buyer, or a source of tax revenue. Its presence acquires a local constituency.

None of this relieves Brazil of the need for scrutiny. The heavy concentration of exports in a few commodities creates vulnerability. Chinese manufactured goods can displace domestic production. Infrastructure, minerals, technology, and energy projects require careful regulation and negotiation.

Familiarity, however, changes the politics of the debate. Washington should not underestimate the effect of China’s material presence. It is difficult to portray the country only as a strategic threat when Brazilians also know it through products they value, jobs in their communities, and investments with visible local benefits.

A person can distrust the Chinese government and still like a BYD car. Public skepticism toward Beijing can coexist with enthusiasm for Chinese technology or support for a project that brings employment to a Brazilian state.

These routine encounters matter. China’s influence is growing through commerce and convenience, not only through diplomacy.

The limits of American warnings

The United States still has assets in Latin America that China cannot easily reproduce. Its cultural influence is deeper. Family, educational, and business ties span generations. The country remains a leading destination for migrants, students, and entrepreneurs. American companies and institutions are deeply embedded across the region.

Washington continues to lean heavily on those advantages and has answered China’s expansion mainly with warnings about dependence, security risks, and Beijing’s strategic intentions. Some warnings are justified. Governments should assess the risks surrounding telecommunications networks, critical infrastructure, strategic minerals, and sensitive technologies. Chinese investments should not be exempt from the same security, environmental, and competition concerns applied to other foreign investors.

But warnings carry little weight when Washington offers no credible alternative.

Latin Americans often encounter China through a new product, a trade agreement, an infrastructure project, or an industrial investment. By contrast, some of Washington’s most visible recent moves have involved tariff threats, immigration restrictions, and pressure on governments to reduce their ties with Beijing.

That contrast weakens the American argument.

The United States cannot assume that proximity, history, and cultural influence will compensate indefinitely for an inconsistent economic presence. Nor can it expect governments to reject Chinese capital or technology when no comparable alternative is available.

A more effective policy would begin with the region’s own priorities and offer partnerships durable enough to survive changes of power in Washington. It also means dealing with Latin American countries as actors with legitimate interests of their own. They do not see themselves merely as pieces in a strategic contest between the United States and China.

Regional governments also need a clearer strategy. Competition between the two powers will produce better outcomes only when countries have the technical capacity, regulatory institutions, and political discipline to negotiate well. Without those capabilities, deals will continue to be shaped mainly by the interests of Washington or Beijing.

China does not need to be beloved in Latin America. Familiarity and usefulness may be enough, particularly while the United States sends mixed signals about the kind of partner it intends to be.

The Pew survey captures both sides of the shift: China is becoming harder to ignore as the United States becomes harder to trust.

Washington will not change the trend by asking Latin Americans to fear China. It will have to show, through its own conduct, why the United States remains the more dependable partner.

Bruna Santos is the director of the Brazil Program at the Inter-American Dialogue. She previously led the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars. Prior to that, she served as vice president and director of innovation at Brazil’s National School of Public Administration (Enap), the country’s premier government training institution.

This article was originally published by the Inter-American Dialogue. Republished with permission from the author.

 

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