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Colombia and the New US National Security Strategy
The US National Security Strategy provides a set of tools for realigning Colombia.
BY ENRIQUE MILLÁN-MEJÍA
The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) marks the most significant shift in Washington’s hemispheric posture in a generation. It resurrects the original standard of the America First policy by reinforcing a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine; it recasts the Western Hemisphere as the refoundation landscape of U.S. national security rather than a peripheral arena. For Latin American countries with current free-trade agreements (FTAs) with Washington, including Colombia, this moment is both pivotal and demanding.
The NSS frames U.S. power competition around three priorities: ending mass irregular migration; rebuilding industrial capacity through nearshoring and friendshoring; and safeguarding technological and military dominance against “revisionist and opaque competitors,” principally China. This reorientation elevates the region from a diplomatic afterthought to a core strategic theater.
The “Trump Corollary” embedded throughout the document asserts that the whole western hemisphere is a priority security zone; extra-regional powers, including China in particular, must be constrained in strategic sectors (critical minerals, agri-food, and strategic infrastructure), and current and potential trade partners are expected to align on migration control, supply-chain resilience, and security cooperation.
This is not a treaty obligation, but it is a blueprint for how Washington will judge partners, allocate resources, and extend preferential trade and investment benefits. In practice, Colombia and other FTA partners will be evaluated not only on market openness or democratic credentials but on concrete contributions to U.S. national security: precursor chemical control, border and port security, critical infrastructure oversight, and limits on strategic Chinese investment.
Colombia: depending on the upcoming presidential election
No FTA partner sits more squarely at the intersection of U.S. priorities than Colombia. For more than two decades, it has been the United States’ most capable security partner in the region, whether in intelligence, counternarcotics, maritime operations, or even training the armed forces of third countries. The NSS envisions a new generation of cooperation: increased intelligence sharing; joint cyber defense; maritime domain awareness; and financial tracking of transnational criminal networks.
But expectations are rising. Washington now demands measurable progress from Colombia in precursor chemical control, counternarcotics operations, judicial cooperation, and border plus maritime enforcement. Colombia’s ability to meet these benchmarks will shape whether it is viewed as a hemispheric “champion.”
This makes the 2026 presidential election in Colombia strategically consequential. A new, fresh government, away from President Petro’s rhetoric, should maintain security cooperation, ensure regulatory stability, moderate fiscal and industrial policies, and place guardrails on strategic Chinese investment, which could elevate Colombia into the small circle of indispensable U.S. partners. Conversely, an extension of Petro’s government by one of his political allies, with an easy-going, lenient approach to drug trafficking, unpredictable economic regulation, or expanded Chinese influence in energy, mining, or digital networks, could undermine Colombia’s privileged position despite its FTA and long-standing alliance.
Colombia stands at a crossroads: it can anchor the U.S. security architecture in South America, or it can drift toward ambiguity at precisely the moment Washington is eliminating gray zones.
NSS partner’s selection
At the heart of the NSS is a hemispheric strategy of “Enlist and Expand.” Washington seeks regional champions capable of delivering measurable results on migration enforcement, combating synthetic drug networks, and anchoring secure supply chains. Colombia, despite the erratic foreign and anti-narcotics policies of the current administration, still has a structural advantage because it remains a full FTA partner of the US. Still, that position does not provide automatic benefits as a partner under the NSS approach.
To be considered first-tier partners, as mentioned before in the case of Colombia, this should be joined by providing predictability and capacity: institutional stability, regulatory clarity, political moderation, and a willingness to align security priorities, including demonstrating tangible capabilities, for instance, investment in border management, regulatory oversight of ports, telecoms, and digital networks, and credible enforcement against transnational crime.
The nearshoring narrow window
The NSS reframes nearshoring as a national security imperative. Manufacturing must move out of China and closer to U.S. territory: geographically, politically, and technologically. FTAs are provided to certain Latin American countries, particularly Colombia, as a rare strategic, narrow-window opener. The sectors overlap perfectly with the NSS: auto parts, mining and energy components, and critical minerals, in particular, nickel and ferronickel, and include food sourcing as a factor in affordability.
But the window is short-lived. Capital will flow to Colombia only if it can offer trust, a credible rule of law, dependable regulation, and political stability. Colombia benefits from decades of commercial integration with the US, but investor confidence is fragile amid deteriorating security in Colombia, which threatens to erode nearshoring gains.
The NSS does not guarantee investment, merely positions the hemisphere as the preferred destination. Whether countries capture this moment depends on domestic governance; it also implies a new scope of scrutiny, thus opaque Chinese involvement in ports, mining, telecommunications, or cloud infrastructure will invite political friction with Washington and could trigger conditionality on security cooperation or investment guarantees.
The 2025 NSS does not force Colombia or other LAC partners to choose sides, but it dramatically raises the cost of ambiguity. For countries with FTAs, such as Colombia, the hemisphere’s renewed strategic relevance offers leverage not seen since the post–Cold War era. Whether Colombia can translate that relevance into economic opportunity and stronger political partnerships depends on stability at home, clarity in strategy, and a willingness to engage Washington’s new enduring priorities.
Enrique Millán-Mejía is a Senior Fellow for Economic Development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council.
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